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Abstract
The  studies  concerning  the  impact  of  corruption  on  the  effectiveness  of  governance  are 
numerous,  valorising profound  approaches,  based  on  criteria  and  standards  related  to  good 
governance, organizational behaviour.
The concepts and mechanisms specific for econometrics and statistics provide the quantitative 
support for qualitative analyses, substantiating public policies, in view to assure effectiveness in 
performance measurement.
For EU Member States and acceding countries, the level of development and social organization 
determines specific ethical behaviours.
In this  context,  the current paper aims  a comparative economic  and social  evaluation of the 
correlations between corruption, performance and economic freedom in the states mentioned, 
following the various significant stages of the EU enlargement.
The working hypotheses turn into consideration the following issues:
 Corruption holds national specific character and the statistic, econometric or sociologic 
analyses reveal that it is stable during time.
 The climate of economic freedom and the intensity of corruption influence powerfully the 
economic performance.
 The EU membership, “seniority” in EU, regional context determine different attitudes and 
perceptions on the corruption phenomena.
 For the newer EU states or the acceding countries, the strategies of integrity have mimetic 
character and the National Integrity Systems have structured powerful connections aimed 
at determining an action focused on public integrity. 
In the analyses achieved, the EU is approached globally, at least from statistic point of view, and 
the conclusions aim situations  specific to  the  groups of states  that have  been or  will  be the 
beneficiaries of the EU enlargement.
The quantitative analyses use both own results of the researches carried out by the authors and 
public results of World Bank or Heritage Foundation, as well as results of authorities responsible 
for national statistics.
The paper uses the theoretical framework described by authors in other papers with similar topic. 
For the current paper, the distinction consists in the correlation of the analyses with the stages of 
the EU enlargement.
Key words: public integrity, corruption, governance performance, economic freedom3
I The governance performance
I.1. A Systemic Framework 
The issue of governance performance is more and more present in the field literature. Regarded 
as a finality of a complex public management process, the governance performance, we refer 
either to the central, or to the local government, acquires systemic characteristics and, according 
to  their  level,  the  governors  establish  the  feedback  that  is  carried  put  through  new  public 
decisions meant to lead towards a performance improvement. 
The concerns for a systemic modelling of the public management can be met both when the issue 
of the public administration comes out (Pierre, 1995) and, lately, the public management reform
1
(Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000). A brief presentation of some systemic models used in the public 
management  of  the  local  development  is  also  made  by  Matei  (2008).  Referring  to  the 
performance oriented managerial reforms, Pollitt (1995; 1998) shows that, for the public sector 
“the organisations must redirect in order to focus more on results. These have to take into account 
the costs, to measure the outputs, to assess the effects and to use all this information in a systemic 
process of feedback and continuous improvement”.
2
The most relevant and recent point of view respecting the systemic approach of the public sector 
performance is presented by Bouckaert and Halligan (2008). Following a logical sequence of 
building a complex systemic model of the public sector performance, the mentioned authors 
described micro, meso and macro models, integrated or individual, that can deliver the proper 
framework for understanding  and study thoroughly  the specified  concept.
3 The result of this 
measure is a complex system, with mixed architecture that includes more cycles of intermediary 
feedback  and  that  integrates  “four  positions  on  managing  performance:  Performance 
Administration,  Management  of  Performance,  Performance  Management  and  Performance 
Governance”.
4 In this context, the governance performance can be seen as a subsystem of the 
public  sector  performance  or,  more,  of  the  managerial  performance.  The  specific  of  the 
governance performance is also that of being a result of the interaction between public economic 
systems  and  that  of  the  public  management.  Thus,  the  fundamental  concepts  as  the  public 
intervention, public decision, optimisation, and so on, become adjacent and determinant for the 
level of the governance performance.  
I.2. Present approaches
Bouckaert  and  Halligan  (2008)  make  an  international  comparison  related  to  “managing 
performance”. The statistical ratios and/or connections between management the performance, in 
the context of the public sector, become determinant both for the understanding of the processes 
of performance’s management, and for the governance performance. 
                                                
1 Pollitt, Ch., Bouckaert, G., (2000), “Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis”, Oxford University 
Press, Epigraf Publishing House, pp. 39.
2 Idem, pp. 154.
3 Bouckaert, G., Halligan, J., (2008), “Managing Performance. International Comparisons”, Routledge, London and 
New York, pp. 11 – 34.
4 Idem, pp. 32.4
The  general  approach  framework  of  this  issue  is  delivered  by  the  New  Public  Management 
(Hood, 1995) or by “reinventing government” (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992).
A broad and generic definition of performance – based public management is taking/allocating 
responsibility for the performance of the system and being accountable for its results.
5
Hannagan (2008), referring to the performance management in an organisation, states that “the 
term  performance  management  means  different  practices  to  different  managers  but  usually 
includes the following elements:
 The organisation has a shared of its objectives, or a mission statement or corporate objectives, 
which it communicates to its employees;
 Individual performance management targets are set which are related to the organisational 
objectives;
 A regular, formal review is carried out to monitor progress toward the objectives;
 The  review  process  is  used  to  identify  training  needs,  career  development  and  possible 
rewards;
 The effectiveness of the whole process is evaluated against the overall performance of the 
organisation”.
6
Important and constant concerns this time with regard to the performance of the public sector can 
be also found in the UN Public Administration Programme
7, which in the 2005and 2008 reports 
presents  both  the  public  sector  performance  (WPSR,  2005),  and  the  issue  of  the  public 
governance  (WPSR,  2008).  Thus,  WPSR  (2005) focuses  upon  the  way  in  which  the  human 
potential  will  be transformed in  order to  improve  the performance  of the  public sector.  The 
general context in which the stated issue is approached is characterised, on one hand, by the 
complexity of the policy making processes and of the public strategies and, on the other hand, by 
the deterioration of the human resources capacities of accomplishing these functions. The aspects 
set forth render difficult, for many states, the application of the national objectives and strategies 
for increasing the governance performance through poverty and corruption reduction, promoting 
the sustainable human development as it is underlined in the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs).
8      
WPRS (2008) emphasizes the role of the civic engagement in the public governance process. By 
presenting several case studies, it is being emphasised, in a real manner, the role of the different 
practices in consolidating the governance capacity through transparency and responsibility. In the 
context, the relations between the power and the civil society organisations are tackled, as well as 
the necessity of adopting methodologies and strategies proper for each state’s condition for a 
successful civic engagement in the public governance. 
The mentioned technical support is also offered by the analysis made by Willmore (2005). 
The World Bank has achieved comprehensive theoretical and experimental studies in the last 
decades. In view of our study, the papers of Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-Loboton (2009), as well 
as the previous ones approaching the so called “governance matters” are relevant. The above 
papers comprise “six new aggregate measures capturing various dimensions of governance that 
provide  new  evidence  of  a  strong  causal  relationship  from  better  governance to  better 
development outcomes”.
                                                
5 Idem, pp. 32.
6 Hannagan, T., (2008), “Management. Concepts & Practices”, Prentice Hall, pp. 294.
7 See http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN.pdf
8 A more detailed presentation of these aspects can be found in the UN Millennium Declaration, 
http://222.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml5
The  six  indicators  correspond  to  six  basic  governance  concepts:  voice  and  accountability, 
political instability and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law and 
graft.
I.3 An empirical support of analysis for governance performance in the EU
The current study cannot aim an exhaustive approach of governance performance in the EU. Our 
vision and approach are restrictive and use GDP per capita as single indicator.
27 EU Member States as well as 4 acceding states (Croatia, Turkey, Macedonia and Iceland) 
represent the target group that will be discussed.
Annex 1 presents GDP per capita during 1999 – 2009.
The evolution of the EU enlargement had different effects concerning GDP per capita at EU 
level.
Two major conclusions may be extracted from the data presented. Firstly, for all states, especially 
those that accessed since 2004, GDP per capita has been in a visible growth, the moment of 
accession to the EU representing a “jump”, fact that also influenced the economic results.
On the other hand, in  statistic view, the level  of GDP per capita at EU level has decreased 
however related to the one recorded by EU 15.
Table 1 presents the GDP theoretical levels in three hypostases of the EU – EU15, EU25, EU27 –
and in the fourth hypostasis, taking also into consideration the possible enlargement EU31.
Table 1. GDP per capita in various hypostases of the EU enlargement
(GDP per capita in US dollars, current market prices)
Year EU15 EU25 EU27 EU31
1999 23561.04 21573.86 20651.15 19980.11
2000 25182.18 23026.31 22021.95 20249.90
2001 26432.02 24186.94 23143.83 21154.85
2002 27357.70 25077.84 23999.20 21903.67
2003 27886.45 25617.36 24529.98 22379.20
2004 29078.42 26774.81 25655.64 23516.24
2005 30258.85 27899.54 26724.20 24597.28
2006 31839.61 29405.52 28174.45 26005.50
2007 33463.06 30975.34 29697.74 27420.04
2008 34001.78 31625.75 30324.57 28036.06
2009 33871.86 31592.45 30259.90 27666.11
Analysing  the  correlations  and  influences  of  the  groups  of  representative  states  in  the  four 
hypostases presented (Annex 2), one may remark that in spite of the decrease of GDP per capita, 
the  correlations  are  powerfully  comprised  between  0.886  (between  EU25_15_GDP  and 
EU31_27_GDP)  and  1.  Therefore,  the  trend  of  economic  growth  is  similar  for  the  states 
analysed. 6
I.4 The integrity, as a governance principle in the public sector
Along with the UN concerns there are also the ones of the World Bank, who dedicate numerous 
studies  both  to  the  researches  regarding  the  Governance  Indices  and  the  Public  Sector 
Governance.  The  concern  of  the  present  paper  is  situated  at  the  meeting  point  of  the  two 
mentioned topics. Worth to be mentioned, from the point of view of the World Bank, are the 
governance principles in the public sector, which are referring to:
 Responsibility – according to which the public authority is responsible for the decisions 
and  promotes  mechanisms  that  ensure  the  application  of  public  management  high 
standards;
 Transparency/ openness – that expresses the public authority capacity regarding the roles 
and responsibilities assumed, as well as the decision-making procedures and the power 
exercise;
 Integrity – with reference to the public and personal, impartial, ethical action, and in the
interest of the public authority;
 Stewardship – imposing the use of each opportunity for developing the public assets;
 Efficiency – ensuring the best use of resources in order to accomplish the organisation’s 
objectives;
 Leadership – applied through a commitment for good governance.
9      
All  these  principles  lead  to  a  public  governance  approach  that  would  allow  obtaining  some 
superior results, in terms of efficiency and with a high performance.
10
In the view presented in the above papers, the public sector governance includes: “…the set of 
responsibilities and practices, policies and procedures, exercised by an agency’s executive, to 
provide  strategic  direction,  ensure  objectives  are  achieved,  manage  risks  and  use  resources 
responsibly and with accountability”.
11 We used this approach of the concept of public sector 
governance giving the practical approach manner and turning account of the possible connections 
with the second part of the paper referring to integrity and economic freedom. The State Services 
Authority (SSA) from Australia addresses the issue in the same manner, accentuating the public 
integrity among the main pillars of public integrity, assuming the “promotion of high integrity 
and conduct standards in the public sector”.
12 Similar stands took the Association of Chartered 
Certified Accountants (ACCA), emphasising the fact that “the governance can also cover the 
behaviour standards, the organisational structures and the processes”.
13
At  the  same  time,  OECD  states  that  “good,  effective  public  governance  helps  to  strengthen 
democracy and human rights, promote economic prosperity and social cohesion, reduce poverty, 
enhance  environmental  protection  and  the  sustainable  use  of  natural  resources,  and  deepen 
confidence  in  government  and  public  administration”.
14 The  real  issue  of  public  integrity  is 
                                                
9 ANAO, (2003), “Public Sector Governance”, Volumes 1&2: Better Practice Guide, Commonwealth of Australia, 
Canberra, pp.2.
10 For details and explanations can be seen also Australia Public Service Commission, (2005), “Foundations of 
Governance in the Australian Public Service”, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 
http://www.apsc.gov.au/foundations/ 
11 ANAO and Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, (2006), “Implementation of Programme and Policy 
Initiatives: Making Implementation Matter, Better Practice Guide, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 13, 
http://www.anao.gov.au/uploads/documents/”
12 “Public Sector Standards Commissioner (PSSC), Ethics framework”, http://www.ssa.vie.gov.au/
13 http://www.accaglobal.com/.../activities/subjects/publicsector/governance/
14 OECD, (2009), “Public Governance and Management”, http://www.oecd.org, pp.1.7
developed by OECD, in this very moment a global forum is being organised with regard to 
“building integrity in government”.
15
II The corruption, integrity and economic freedoms.
As it was also shown in the 1
st chapter of the present paper there are several indices of the 
governance performance. We will keep in mind as indices, as Prohniţchi (2003) does too, the 
Gross  Domestic  Product  (GDP)  per  inhabitant, as  well  as  the  economic freedom (IEF).  The 
mentioned author reaffirms the conclusions of the World Bank or Transparency International, 
according to which “the poorer the country and the more reduced is the economic freedom, the 
more corrupt is its bureaucratic and political system”.
16 The present study perspective determines 
us to take into account many organisations’ analysis based on the conclusion that the “concern 
about the negative social and economic impact of corruption has grown rapidly in both emerging 
and advanced democracies”.
17
The conclusion is also supported by the World Bank who identifies the concept “as the single 
greatest obstacle to economic and social development. It undermines development by distorting 
the rule of law and weakening the institutional foundation on which economic growth depends”. 
18 A similar position is that of the International Monetary Fund, which states that “many of the 
causes of corruption are economic in nature, and are its consequences – poor governance clearly 
is detrimental to economic activity and welfare”.
19
The development of theoretical and empirical studies has not always been the cause and effect 
type, between corruption and economic performance. 
Worth mentioning here are the comments made by Rose-Ackerman (2009) with regard to the 
conclusions expressed by different specialists and analysts of the corruption issue.
20
Mauro  (1995,  1998)  demonstrates  that  the  high  corruption  levels  are  associated  with  low 
investment levels as part of GDP.
The corruption indices are extremely isolated from the bureaucratic efficiency, as for example the 
level of bureaucracy and judicious quality. As a consequence, Mauro was incapable of measuring 
the marginal effect of each of these measures. By putting together the separated indices in a 
measure of bureaucratic efficiency (on a scale from one to ten): “if Bangladesh, with a score of 
4.7 would have improved the integrity and the bureaucratic efficiency at Uruguay’s level, 6.8, its 
investment rate would increase with approximately five percentage points and the annual growth 
rate of GDP would increase with almost half of a percentage point” (Mauro, 1998). Also, Mauro 
proves that the extremely corrupted countries tend to under-invest in human capital, spending less 
                                                
15 Details regarding the recent concerns of OECD about promoting governance integrity can be found, for example, 
in “Building a Clearer World: Tools and Good Practices for Fostering a Culture of Integrity” (2009), Paris, 
http://www.oecd.publicgovernanceforum.org/, or “OECD Recommendation on Enhancing Integrity in Public 
Procurement”, (2008), http://www.oecd.org/document/...html.
16 Prohniţchi, V., (2003), “Contextul economic şi instituţional al corupţiei”, Analytic Report, RA/1, TISH Publishing 
House, pp. 31. http://www.transparency.org/
17 Akai, N., Horinchi,Y., Sakata, M., (2005), “Short-run and Long-run Effects of Corruption on Economic Growth: 
Evidence from State-Level Cross-Section Data for the United States”, CIRJE – F – 348, http://www.e.n-
tokyo.ac.jp/cirje/research/
18 http://www.worldbank.org/
19 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues6/
20 Rose-Ackerman, S., (2005), “Corruption and Government. Causes, Consequences and Reform”, Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 3.8
on  education.  Mauro  argues  that  this  fact  happens  because  the  education  delivers  less  work 
opportunities for corruption than other types of capital-intensive public expenditures.  
Ades and Di Tella (1997) state that an aggressive industrial policy could be motivated, on a 
certain extent, by the corrupt gains made available by that policy. In such cases, the positive 
direct  effect of  the  policy could  be submitted  by its  role in  the increase  of  corruption,  thus 
discouraging the investments. Their empirical results demonstrate that, in presence of corruption, 
the positive influence of the industrial policy is reduced to a half.
Also, for public integrity we end up choosing the corruption perceptions index (TI) computed by 
Transparency International in the last decade, for the South-Eastern Europe states
21, as well as the 
KKM index  (control of  corruption)  computed  by the  World  Bank, for  the same sample  and 
period, as aggregated and individual governance index. The two used indices express, in different 
ways, the perception upon the way in which the public power exercise has an impact upon the 
private  sector  profit,  including  both  the  narrow  and  the  wide  corruption  form,  as  well  as 
“capturing” the states by the elites and the personal interests.    
II.1 Corruption and governance
One of the fundamental papers presenting the indissoluble link between the corruption and the 
governance  is  that  of  Rose-Ackerman  (2005)  that  eloquently  proves  how  the  high  level  of 
corruption  limits  the  investment  and  the  economic  growth  and  leads  to  the  government’s 
inefficiency. 
For the developing countries, as well as for those being in transition from socialism, the risk is 
higher.  The  mentioned  author  identifies  the  corruption  phenomenon  as  a  complex  one  of 
economic
22, cultural
23 and political
24 nature.  
Also, a series of classical papers must be mentioned, having as object the identification of causes 
and mechanisms of corruption transmission inside a economic and social system, form which we 
mention: Krueger (1974), Rose-Ackerman (1975), Mauro (1995), Tanzi (1998), etc. in the field 
literature four categories of factor are identified, which directly influence the corruption in a 
system:, historical factors, social and cultural factors and economic factors. In the political and 
juridical  factors  category  we  include  the  quality  of  the  political  system,  the  features  of  the 
juridical  system  (Leite  and  Weidmann  (1999)),  especially  the  legislation  and  the  institutions 
specialised in the fight against corruption, the quality of the democratic system, the features of 
the  electoral  system  in  a  country,  the  features  of  the  administrative  system,  the  degree  of 
administrative decentralisation in a country etc. A series of studies, like La Porta (1999) and 
Treisman (2000) accentuate the influence of the traditions and historical factors upon the level of 
corruption in a country and the features of the mechanisms of its development and transmission. 
The social and cultural factors have a special role in accentuating the corruption features in a 
country (La Porta (1999), Treisman (2000), Alesina (2003)). Equally, the religious factor play an 
important part in spreading the corruption on a social system level. The economic factors, as well 
as the openness level of the economy (for example Dreher (2003), Treisman (2000), Wei (2001)), 
the size of the public sector (Tanzi (1998), Treisman (2000)), the salaries’ level in the public 
sector  (van  Rijckeghem  and  Weber  (1997))  etc.  directly  influence  the  corruption  level  in  a 
country. 
                                                
21 http:/www.transparency.org/
22 See more details in Rose-Ackerman, S., (2005), “Corruption and Government Causes, Consequences and 
Reform”, part I, chapters 1-5, pp. 7-89.
23 Rose-Ackerman, S., (2005), op.cit., part II, chapter 6, pp. 89-111.
24 Rose-Ackerman, S., (2005), op.cit., part III, chapter 7-9, pp. 111-175.9
Another important aspect when studying corruption is choosing the most appropriate econometric 
models  for  estimating  its  effects  upon  some  sectors  of  activities.  From  the  most  important 
research directions that target the estimation of corruption’s effects upon the economic and social 
environment, we mention:
(i) Measuring the corruption effect upon the economic growth (Mauro (1995), Abed and 
Davoodi (2000), Krueger (1974));
(ii) The corruption’s effects upon the development of some sectors of national economies
(Tanzi (1998), Wei (2001));
(iii) The  effects  of  the  decentralisation  process  upon  the  level  and  the  mechanisms of 
corruption transmission in a system (Shah (2006)) etc.;
(iv) The consequences of corruption upon the financing systems of some activity sectors, 
like the military one, Gupta (2001), the salaries in the public sectors (van Rijckeghem 
and Weber (1997)).
For the states in South-Eastern Europe, with special reference to Romania, we remark the papers 
of  Andrei,  Matei  and  Rosca  (2009),  as  well  as  Andrei,  Matei,  Stancu  and  Andrei  (2009), 
approaching the effects of corruption in the public administration systems, education or health, 
formulating econometric models for evaluating performance in the public sector.
II.2 Public Integrity Systems
The first chapter of  the  paper approached the  relation  between integrity and  performance of 
governance.  The  National  Integrity  Systems  (NIS)  represent  an  important  instrument  for 
promoting public integrity.
25
In Transparency International (TI) conception, the National Integrity Systems (NIS) comprise 
“key institutions, laws and practices (the ‘pillars”) that contribute to integrity, transparency and 
accountability in a society. “ 
26
The perspectives of the analysis and modelling the corruption phenomena, aimed by our paper, 
are supported by the country studies that provide both an overview on NIS, the indicators for 
measuring the subsequent progresses from those countries, as well as a basis of comparisons 
among states.
The above  mentioned  country study asserts:  “when  it  functions  correctly,  NIS fights  against 
corruption as part of a broader fight against the abuse of power, breaking the law and fraud under 
all its forms”.
II.2.1 Stages in developing the National Integrity System in Romania
1990 – 1998
- The period coincides with the first half of the transition period;
- The main exponents of the national public integrity were the Parliament and Government, 
that did not elaborate a public policy to promote the public integrity;
                                                
25 The  broad  description  of  the  relations  between  public  integrity  and  corruption  concerning  the  South-Eastern 
European states is presented in Matei, A., (2008), “Corruption, Transparency and Quality. Comparative Approaches 
and Judiciary Support; Themis Project “Transformation of the Role of the Judiciary within a European Integrated 
Context”, Bibliothéque de Droit Public Européen, vol LXXXV, Esperia Publications Ltd, London, pp. 127-142
26 “National Integrity System.  Country Study. Romania 2005, Transparency International Romania, p 1.10
- The Judiciary had no capacity to adjust the deficiencies of the other 2 powers in the state;
- The social perception on the public pillars reveals a high degree of corruption, just in the 
interior of most of the public integrity pillars;
- The  civil  society  was  not  concerned  with  corruption,  focusing  on  ensuring  the  basic 
requirements of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights;
- The international institutions were concerned about the economic and democratic reforms.
1999 – 2004
- The second stage coincides with the beginning of the negotiations of accession into the 
European Union;
- The international  agencies have  expressed their  interest towards  the Romanian  public 
integrity  system  (programmes  were  initiated  and  political  pressures  were  exerted  for 
reforms);
- The  main  pillars  of  integrity  – the  Executive  and  Legislative  – have  realised  the 
seriousness of the national corruption level;
- In 2001, the Government elaborated a National Anticorruption Strategy and the National 
Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office was set up;
- Other NIS pillars were strengthened, such as Ombudsman or Court of Accounts.
- The progresses have determined Romania  to become NATO member and closing the 
negotiations for accession into the European Union;
- The other pillars: Parliament, justice, police have not recorded progresses;
- The civil society was focused on the fight against corruption, adding on the public agenda 
law drafts, essential for public integrity;
- The public policies designed to ensure the cooperation between pillars were inconsistent, 
proving a low capacity of implementation and reduced political will.
2005 – 2007
- The  third  period  coincides  with  signing  the  Treaty  of  Romania  Accession  into  the 
European Union;
- The main political criteria were fulfilled;
- Romania should implement effectively EU standards in the area of justice concerning 
corruption level, competition and control in customs.
2007 – present
- Getting thorough knowledge about European standards, instruments and practices about 
strengthening public integrity as indicator of efficient governance.
The stages undergone by Romania in order to develop its own integrity system are present, with 
certain features in most states analysed in the actual paper.11
II.3 Integrity Framework
The concerns of various public bodies, institutions and authorities, universities or outstanding 
specialists  have  shaped  a  model  for  ethics  framework  in  the  public  sector
27.  Adapting  this 
framework to the general topic of public integrity, we obtain a logical causal relation between 
integrity and performance of governance. 
Figure 1 Integrity Framework
The Integrity Framework comprises in fact three subsystems concerning: integrity leadership, 
creating the integrity system and managing the integrity system. We add the integrity resource 
kit, referring to take the integrity challenge, to develop integrity skills and implement the kit.
                                                
27 See “State Services Authority: Supporting Government Serving Victorians – Ethics Framework”,
http://www.ssa.vic.gov.au/.../Ethics Framework
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II.4 An empirical support concerning the analysis of corruption in the EU
The empirical study uses the coefficient of control of corruption turned into account by the World 
bank in view of assessing the governance performance (KKM). The analysed time horizon is 
1999-2008 and it approaches the EU evolution in its last three stages – EU15, EU25 and EU27 –
as well as a virtual one – EU31.
Annex 3 presents the general results for each state and the aggregated results at the EU level.
Relevant conclusions derive from the analysis of Table 2.
Table 2. Index of control of corruption – KKM – in different hypostases 
of the EU evolution
Year EU15 EU25 EU27 EU31
2000 1.62 1.45 1.35 1.14
2002 1.56 1.38 1.28 1.05
2003 1.57 1.40 1.30 1.10
2004 1.50 1.33 1.24 1.06
2005 1.42 1.26 1.18 1.02
2006 1.42 1.25 1.17 1.02
2007 1.40 1.23 1.15 1.00
2008 1.37 1.22 1.14 1.00
As the EU enlarges, the index of corruption is lower, demonstrating a trend of growth for the 
corruption phenomenon. The influences may be emphasised clearer if we analyse the statistic 
correlations of the aggregated variables (see Annex 4).
The  inverse  powerful  correlations  are  due  to  the  group  of  acceding states  (described  by  the 
variable EU31_27_KKM), reaching -838 (related to EU15), -810 (related to EU25), -798 (related 
to EU27) or -565 (related to EU31). At the same time, we also remark inverse correlations related 
to the evolution of corruption, specific for the states that accessed after 2004 and the acceding
states, but the cause seems to be the same group, previously identified.
II.5 Economic freedom
According  to  the  assertions  of  Heritage  Foundation,  the  economic  freedom  represents  the 
individual’s  right  to  control  his/her  work  and  property.  In  an  economically  free  society, the 
individuals have the freedom to work, produce, consume and invest in any way, being protected 
and not constrained by the state. In order to determine the global indicator of economic freedom 
(IEF), Heritage Foundation uses ten specific indicators, evaluated on fields such as: business, 
trade,  taxation,  government  size,  monetary  freedom,  investment,  finance,  right  to  property, 
freedom from corruption, labour.13
Altman (2007) analyses the impact of economic freedom, including its various components, on 
the global economic performance of a country. The author states that some specific indicators of 
IEF are positively correlated to higher levels of GDP per capita, while other indicators are in the 
opposite situation.
Hall and Lawson (2008) conclude concerning Altman’s approaches (2007): ‚Altman’s simple 
correlations add nothing to the on-going and important discussion about the role of economic 
freedom in contributing to aggregate economic performance”
28.
The specialised literature emphasises connections between the economic freedom and corruption.
Graeff  and  Mehlkop  (2003)  investigate  the  impact  of  various  components  of  the  economic 
freedom  on  corruption.  Also,  in  this  case,  the  results  confirm  the  fact  that  certain  fields  of 
economic freedom discourage corruption – financial and monetary freedom, freedom of affairs-
while others favour corruption – dimension of government. 
At the same time, Rose-Ackerman (1997) remarks the possibility to increase corruption when 
obstacles  are  imposed  in  free  development  of  economy.  Eiras  (2003)  carries  out  a  complex 
analysis, referring to ethics, corruption and economic freedom. The conclusions of the author
29
reveal  relations  between  the  economic  freedom  and  corruption  on  the  formal  and  informal 
economic activities. Informal economy, direct effect of the corruption phenomena will have a 
higher weight in GDP as long as the economic freedom disappears. „On average, the size of the 
informal economy in economically non-free and repressed economies is almost three times the 
size  of the informal economy in  free economies  and almost  double the size  of the informal 
economy in mostly free economies”
30. 
The following charts are illustrative in the study mentioned, showing “the relationship between 
economic freedom and the level of corruption in 95 countries around the world.  Chart 1 shows a 
strong  correlation  between  these  two  factors.  As  economic  freedom  vanishes,  corruption 
flourishes. On average, as shown in Chart 2, the level of perceived morality- as a contrast to 
corruption- in economically free countries is almost four times the level of perceived morality in 
the public sector in mostly non-free or repressed economies, and almost 60 percent greater than 
in mostly free economies”
31.
                                                
28 Hall, J., Lawson, R., (2008), “Theory and evidence on economic freedom and economic growth: A comment”, 
Economics Bulletin, Vol 15, No. 18, p.3
Altman, M., (2007), “How much Economic Freedom is Necessary for Economic Growth? Theory and Evidence”, 
Economics Bulletin, Vol 15, No. 2, pp. 1-20.
29 Ana Isabel Eiras in Senior Policy Analyst for International Economies in the Center for International Trade and 
Economies at the Heritage Foundation.
30 Eiras, A., J., (2003), “Ethics, Corruption and Economic Freedom” Conference “Ethical Foundations of the 
Economy”, Krakow, Poland
31 Idem 314
Chart 1. Economic Freedom and Corruption
Sources:  Gerald  P.  O’Driscoll,  Jr.,  Edwin  J.  Feulner,  and  Mary  Anastasia  O’Grady,  2003  Index  of  Economic 
Freedom (Washington,  D.C.:  The  Heritage  Foundation  and  Dow  Jones  &  Company,  Inc.,  2003);  Transparency 
International,  The  Corruption  Perception  Index  2001  and  2000,  Berlin,  Germany,  2001  and  2000,  available  at 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2001.htm
and http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2000.htm15
Chart 2. Economic Freedom and Corruption
Sources:  Gerald  P.  O’Driscoll,  Jr.,  Edwin  J.  Feulner,  and  Mary  Anastasia  O’Grady,  2003  Index  of  Economic 
Freedom (Washington,  D.C.:  The  Heritage  Foundation  and  Dow  Jones  &  Company,  Inc.,  2003);  Transparency 
International,  The  Corruption  Perception  Index  2001  and  2000,  Berlin,  Germany,  2001  and  2000,  available  at 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2001.htm                
and http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2000.htm
                                                          
Mushfiq  and Dean (2007) achieve similar studies with the study proposed in the current paper, 
using an econometric model applied in a panel of 60 countries, including the economic freedom 
as independent variable. 
II.6. An empirical support for the analysis of the economic freedom in the EU
The presented empirical analysis uses the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF), calculated and 
published by The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal.
The analysed time horizon is 1999-2008 and, as in the previous empirical analyses, it approaches 
the evolution of the economic freedom in the EU in the significant stages of enlargement. 
Annex 5 presents the general results for each state and the aggregated results at the EU level or 
groups of states in the EU or acceding countries.
Relevant conclusions concerning the IEF evolution related to the EU enlargement result from 
Table 3.16
Table 3. Index of economic freedom – IEF – for different stages of the  EU enlargement
Year EU15 EU25 EU27 EU31
1999 7.46 7.28 7.15 6.96
2000 7.25 7.10 6.98 6.76
2001 7.23 7.10 7.01 6.80
2002 7.41 7.26 7.18 7.01
2003 7.44 7.35 7.26 7.11
2004 7.48 7.40 7.34 7.20
2005 7.43 7.36 7.31 7.18
2006 7.43 7.36 7.33 7.21
2007 7.00 6.91 6.86 6.75
2008 6.94 6.88 6.85 6.79
Also in this case, as the EU enlarges, the index of economic freedom is lower at global level, 
stabilising the EU global economy in the areas: “moderately free”, respectively “mostly free”.
Obviously,  the  presented  analysis  has  a  global  statistic  nature,  in  the  European  economy 
coexisting economies with a high index of economic freedom (UK (7,65-8.25), NL (7.50 – 8.04), 
IE (7.75 – 8.25)) with the economies with a very low index of economic freedom (RO (4.98 –
6.79), PL (5.95 – 6.78)).
Annex  4  reveals  an  analysis on  groups of  states,  related to  the  present and  future  stages  of 
enlargement.
The  correlations  in  Annex  6  highlight  low  inverse  correlations  between  the  group  of  states 
accessed in  2007  (EU27_25_IEF)  and  EU15,  as  well  as  positive  correlations,  but  very  low 
correlations between the acceding states  (EU31_27_IEF) and EU15.
III An empirical comparative study
The  theoretical  framework  briefly  presented  in  the  first  two  chapters  of  the  paper  again 
substantiates the idea of some mutual determinations between public integrity, corruption and 
governance performance.
As revealed by the previous chapters, the empirical study focuses on 27 EU Member States, as 
well as the four acceding states to the EU (Croatia, Turkey, Macedonia and Iceland).
The analysed period is 1999 – 2008 and the results regarding the used indices belong to the 
World Bank, Global Integrity or Heritage Foundation. 
The analysis targets the three significant stages in the evolution of the EU enlargement – EU15, 
EU25 and EU27 – as well as a possible future stage where the four acceding states will be 
involved – EU31.17
As stated, from the indices of governmental performance we took into consideration the Gross 
Domestic Product per capita (GDP) and the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF).
The  qualitative  data  are  presented  in  Annex  1 for  GDP  per  capita  and  Annex  5 for  IEF.  In 
statistical processing, we apply log GDP so that the statistic analyses use data of the same order 
of dimension.
III.1 Linear regressions
The analyses reveal that the single interesting regressions in view of the current study are those 
using  GDP  as  dependent  variables and  IEF  and  KKM  as  independent  variables.  In order  to 
emphasise statistically the influence of the European integration process on public integrity, we 
introduced an independent variable “dummy”, called EU, awarding the following values for each 
state during the analysed period:
                1,  if the respective state is EU Member State
EU = 
                0,  in the opposite case
EU variable introduced in the above regressions will underline quantitatively the influence of the 
integration process on the indicator concerning the control of corruption, KKM.
For KKM, we obtain:
EU15_KKM =  9.323 – 1.738 Log EU15_GDP – 0.01 EU15_IEF + ε1 (III.1)
         
EU25_KKM =  8.406 – 1.570 Log EU25_GDP – 0.018 EU25_IEF + ε2 (III.2)
EU27_KKM =  7.472 – 1.395 Log EU27_GDP – 0.012 EU27_IEF + ε3 (III.3)
EU31_KKM =  4.533 – 0.793 Log EU31_GDP – 0.001 EU31_IEF + ε4 (III.4)
The four relations show  different dependencies for each stage of enlargement. As it is natural, 
GDP per capita has the greatest influence, being well known the fact that the level of  public 
integrity depends decisively on the living standard.
At  the same time,  the relations (III.1) - (III.4)  demonstrate IEF low influence on the public 
integrity as its coefficients in the equations of regression are very small.
Eventual contradictions in the evolutions of some parameters are due to the low level of the series 
of data, triggering low levels of significance.
The  introduction  of  the  EU  variable,  previously  defined, will  change  significantly  the 
dependencies between the analysed variables and will increase the levels of significance of the 
coefficients.18
Thus, we shall obtain:
EU25_KKM = 6.191 – 1.053 Log EU25_GDP + 0.018 EU25_IEF – 0.360 EU + ε5
                        (0.004)   (0.014)        (0.705) (0.103)
(III.5)
EU27_KKM = 5.856 – 0.977 Log EU27_GDP - 0.011 EU27_IEF – 0.269 EU + ε6
                        (0.005)   (0.024)        (0.801) (0.205)
(III.6)
IV. Conclusions
The paper presents a new approach for public integrity in view of the influence of the indices 
concerning GDP and economic freedom. The further developments might take in consideration 
both enlargement of the area of analysis, comprising longer periods, and introducing new indices 
for governmental performance.
At the same time, even in the conditions of the current study, other relevant regressions could be 
determined. 
The modalities for determining the variables EU15, EU25, EU27, respectively EU31 trigger the 
idea of using other types of  regressions in view to better reveal the different variations and 
influences of enlargement on the European governance performance and public integrity.  19
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Annex 1. Evolution of GDP per capita for the EU Member States and acceding states
AT_GDP BE_GDP BG_GDP CY_GDP DK_GDP EE_GDP FI_GDP FR_GDP DE_GDP EL_GDP IE_GDP IT_GDP LV_GDP LT_GDP LU_GDP
20.011,00 25.299,00 5.865,00 18.938,00 26.926,00 9.205,00 23.686,00 23.628,00 25.142,00 17.032,00 25.909,00 24.196,00 7.807,00 8.598,00 48.857,00
28.736,00 27.540,00 6.082,00 19.374,00 28.789,00 9.863,00 25.638,00 25.243,00 25.919,00 18.389,00 28.643,00 25.565,00 8.024,00 8.598,00 53.315,00
28.806,00 28.435,00 6.731,00 19.809,00 29.445,00 10.082,00 26.637,00 26.651,00 26.862,00 19.934,00 30.518,00 27.134,00 8.457,00 9.039,00 53.921,00
30.231,00 29.946,00 7.195,00 19.374,00 30.756,00 10.958,00 27.560,00 27.777,00 27.587,00 21.598,00 33.047,00 26.804,00 8.891,00 9.700,00 57.546,00
31.094,00 30.146,00 7.427,00 19.374,00 30.441,00 11.836,00 27.676,00 27.412,00 28.579,00 22.712,00 34.531,00 27.149,00 9.325,00 10.802,00 60.737,00
32.610,00 31.035,00 7.891,00 19.592,00 32.314,00 12.493,00 29.867,00 28.284,00 29.912,00 24.168,00 36.538,00 27.426,00 9.975,00 11.023,00 65.004,00
33.409,00 32.063,00 7.891,00 19.809,00 33.196,00 14.246,00 30.644,00 29.692,00 31.366,00 24.641,00 38.675,00 28.144,00 10.626,00 11.684,00 68.313,00
35.163,00 33.608,00 8.123,00 19.809,00 34.871,00 14.935,00 32.580,00 30.946,00 32.886,00 26.356,00 41.678,00 29.463,00 11.276,00 12.125,00 76.266,00
37.176,00 35.382,00 8.574,00 20.245,00 35.961,00 15.855,00 34.700,00 32.633,00 34.466,00 28.206,00 44.826,00 30.538,00 12.144,00 13.007,00 82.407,00
37.867,00 35.222,00 9.521,00 20.899,00 36.362,00 15.375,00 35.337,00 32.985,00 35.652,00 28.829,00 41.933,00 30.873,00 12.361,00 13.668,00 83.353,00
37.256,00 35.528,00 9.521,00 21.334,00 35.453,00 14.246,00 33.525,00 32.680,00 35.652,00 29.136,00 40.690,00 30.873,00 10.626,00 11.684,00 80.635,00
MT_GDP UK_GDP NL_GDP PL_GDP PT_GDP CZ_GDP RO_GDP SK_GDP SI_GDP ES_GDP SE_GDP HU_GDP HR_GDP TR_GDP MK_GDP
17.616,00 24.249,00 26.933,00 9.996,00 16.113,00 14.312,00 5.780,00 10.403,00 17.728,00 19.824,00 25.801,00 11.260,00 10.820,00 8.046,00 5.870,00
18.269,00 26.041,00 29.371,00 10.555,00 17.067,00 14.975,00 5.780,00 10.962,00 17.509,00 21.295,00 27.726,00 12.099,00 10.820,00 8.724,00 5.870,00
16.964,00 27.585,00 30.796,00 10.953,00 17.804,00 16.178,00 6.225,00 12.058,00 17.509,00 22.597,00 27.971,00 13.563,00 11.041,00 8.178,00 5.435,00
17.181,00 28.888,00 31.943,00 11.563,00 18.447,00 16.872,00 6.445,00 12.970,00 17.947,00 24.067,00 29.004,00 14.755,00 11.482,00 8.217,00 5.435,00
16.964,00 29.862,00 31.716,00 11.990,00 18.799,00 18.000,00 6.891,00 13.603,00 18.166,00 24.759,00 30.076,00 15.412,00 11.924,00 8.316,00 5.653,00
16.746,00 31.741,00 33.221,00 13.020,00 19.178,00 19.311,00 7.558,00 14.681,00 18.822,00 25.968,00 32.078,00 16.308,00 12.366,00 9.595,00 5.870,00
16.964,00 32.684,00 35.111,00 13.786,00 20.656,00 20.366,00 7.781,00 16.175,00 19.041,00 27.377,00 32.298,00 16.952,00 12.587,00 10.841,00 6.087,00
16.746,00 34.137,00 37.150,00 14.842,00 21.656,00 22.012,00 8.448,00 18.020,00 19.260,00 29.580,00 34.456,00 18.008,00 12.587,00 12.074,00 6.522,00
16.746,00 35.543,00 39.333,00 16.111,00 22.806,00 24.063,00 9.337,00 20.079,00 19.479,00 31.650,00 36.632,00 18.748,00 13.249,00 12.798,00 6.957,00
16.529,00 35.855,00 41.453,00 17.875,00 23.162,00 24.595,00 9.337,00 22.081,00 19.916,00 31.744,00 37.309,00 19.272,00 13.911,00 13.342,00 7.391,00
16.964,00 35.855,00 40.216,00 19.253,00 23.162,00 24.595,00 8.566,00 22.081,00 18.822,00 32.052,00 36.697,00 18.971,00 13.249,00 10.841,00 6.957,00
IS_GDP EU15_GDP EU25_GDP EU27_GDP EU31_GDP EU25_15_GDP EU27_15_GDP EU31_15_GDP EU31_25_GDP EU31_27_GDP
28.632,00 23.561,04 21.573,86 20.651,15 18.980,11 11.002,39 9.536,06 8.975,66 7.564,18 8.227,49
28.807,00 25.182,18 23.026,31 22.021,95 20.249,90 11.557,43 9.950,57 9.478,13 8.030,05 8.847,41
30.451,00 26.432,02 24.186,94 23.143,83 21.154,85 12.243,52 10.583,70 9.629,86 7.809,64 8.356,44
31.084,00 27.357,70 25.077,84 23.999,20 21.903,67 12.949,36 11.170,51 9.992,43 7.933,14 8.419,61
30.781,00 27.886,45 25.617,36 24.529,98 22.379,20 13.546,20 11.709,06 10.351,75 8.127,04 8.539,66
33.710,00 29.078,42 26.774,81 25.655,64 23.516,24 14.519,99 12.581,40 11.368,81 9.174,24 9.749,94
35.027,00 30.258,85 27.899,54 26.724,20 24.597,28 15.348,42 13.222,69 12.232,80 10.062,99 10.911,25
35.113,00 31.839,61 29.405,52 28.174,45 26.005,50 16.456,60 14.174,43 13.264,19 11.040,90 12.048,97
36.311,00 33.463,06 30.975,34 29.697,74 27.420,04 17.741,02 15.315,09 14.222,49 11.772,08 12.763,80
36.498,00 34.001,78 31.625,75 30.324,57 28.036,06 18.985,62 16.278,49 15.007,34 12.236,75 13.310,28
36.196,00 33.871,86 31.592,45 30.259,90 27.666,11 19.466,35 16.463,04 14.113,18 10.385,07 10.975,98
Note: The aggregated variables EU15, EU25, etc.represent weighted means related to the populations of the Member States or candidate states on 1 January 200923
Annex 2. Correlations of the GDP aggregated variables related to the stages of the EU enlargement
EU15_GDP EU25_GDP EU27_GDP EU31_GDP EU25_15_GDP EU27_15_GDP EU31_15_GDP EU31_25_GDP EU31_27_GDP
EU15_GDP Pearson Correlation 1 1.000(**) 1.000(**) .999(**) .987(**) .990(**) .983(**) .932(**) .905(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
N 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
EU25_GDP Pearson Correlation 1.000(**) 1 1.000(**) .999(**) .990(**) .993(**) .984(**) .931(**) .904(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
N 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
EU27_GDP Pearson Correlation 1.000(**) 1.000(**) 1 .999(**) .990(**) .993(**) .985(**) .932(**) .905(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
N 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
EU31_GDP Pearson Correlation .999(**) .999(**) .999(**) 1 .989(**) .992(**) .989(**) .944(**) .919(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
N 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
EU25_15_GDP Pearson Correlation .987(**) .990(**) .990(**) .989(**) 1 .999(**) .982(**) .915(**) .886(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
N 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
EU27_15_GDP Pearson Correlation .990(**) .993(**) .993(**) .992(**) .999(**) 1 .986(**) .923(**) .895(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
N 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
EU31_15_GDP Pearson Correlation .983(**) .984(**) .985(**) .989(**) .982(**) .986(**) 1 .974(**) .957(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
N 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
EU31_25_GDP Pearson Correlation .932(**) .931(**) .932(**) .944(**) .915(**) .923(**) .974(**) 1 .997(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
N 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
EU31_27_GDP Pearson Correlation .905(**) .904(**) .905(**) .919(**) .886(**) .895(**) .957(**) .997(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
N 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).24
Annex 3. Evolution of the index of control of corruption (KKM) for the EU Member States and acceding states
AT_KKM BE_KKM BG_KKM CY_KKM DK_KKM EE_KKM FI_KKM FR_KKM DE_KKM EL_KKM IE_KKM IT_KKM LV_KKM LT_KKM LU_KKM MT_KKM UK_KKM
1,850 1,520 -0,140 0,860 2,120 0,660 2,320 1,430 1,970 0,680 1,460 0,890 0,110 0,420 2,040 0,820 2,100
1,850 1,520 -0,140 0,860 2,120 0,660 2,320 1,430 1,970 0,680 1,460 0,890 0,110 0,420 2,040 0,820 2,100
1,960 1,600 -0,030 0,960 2,210 0,730 2,450 1,300 1,960 0,490 1,500 0,670 0,110 0,310 2,210 0,820 2,060
1,960 1,600 -0,030 0,960 2,210 0,730 2,450 1,300 1,960 0,490 1,500 0,670 0,110 0,310 2,210 0,820 2,060
2,030 1,520 0,020 1,030 2,270 0,850 2,410 1,430 1,970 0,510 1,540 0,620 0,300 0,330 1,870 1,220 2,050
2,035 1,470 0,193 0,819 2,322 1,003 2,426 1,417 1,877 0,518 1,402 0,489 0,271 0,388 1,978 1,185 1,946
1,910 1,420 0,080 0,770 2,190 0,980 2,380 1,390 1,850 0,320 1,570 0,250 0,380 0,320 1,820 1,030 1,880
1,930 1,330 -0,040 0,880 2,350 0,950 2,560 1,460 1,790 0,330 1,610 0,330 0,380 0,200 2,000 1,180 1,870
1,973 1,392 -0,190 0,888 2,390 0,979 2,579 1,312 1,782 0,211 1,678 0,320 0,344 0,180 2,235 1,193 1,850
1,822 1,349 -0,170 1,039 2,321 0,938 2,345 1,433 1,773 0,102 1,755 0,129 0,286 0,182 2,024 1,011 1,766
NL_KKM PL_KKM PT_KKM CZ_KKM RO_KKM SK_KKM SI_KKM ES_KKM SE_KKM HU_KKM HR_KKM TR_KKM MK_KKM IS_KKM EU15_KKM EU25_KKM
2,210 0,560 1,190 0,300 -0,290 0,310 0,850 1,400 2,230 0,770 0,070 -0,240 -0,540 2,270 1,619 1,446
2,210 0,560 1,190 0,300 -0,290 0,310 0,850 1,400 2,230 0,770 0,070 -0,240 -0,540 2,270 1,619 1,446
2,170 0,360 1,310 0,360 -0,360 0,130 0,870 1,390 2,240 0,640 0,270 -0,460 -0,730 2,240 1,560 1,376
2,170 0,360 1,310 0,360 -0,360 0,130 0,870 1,390 2,240 0,640 0,270 -0,460 -0,730 2,240 1,560 1,376
2,100 0,410 1,250 0,430 -0,310 0,360 0,910 1,430 2,200 0,680 0,090 -0,210 -0,570 2,440 1,573 1,399
2,017 0,213 1,186 0,401 -0,250 0,487 1,069 1,384 2,140 0,752 0,210 -0,130 -0,440 2,360 1,502 1,326
1,980 0,210 1,120 0,480 -0,210 0,490 0,930 1,310 2,070 0,670 0,210 0,010 -0,380 2,530 1,422 1,258
2,070 0,210 1,060 0,360 -0,140 0,410 1,010 1,140 2,200 0,620 0,090 0,080 -0,320 2,490 1,421 1,252
2,278 0,185 1,096 0,284 -0,170 0,306 0,954 1,129 2,360 0,487 0,059 0,090 -0,280 2,625 1,403 1,229
2,193 0,376 1,080 0,365 -0,060 0,431 0,952 1,182 2,235 0,549 0,121 0,095 -0,110 2,319 1,368 1,219
EU27_KKM EU31_KKM EU31_15_KKM EU27_15_KKM EU25_15_KKM EU31_27_KKM
1,347 1,136 0,082 0,308 0,527 -0,220
1,347 1,136 0,082 0,308 0,527 -0,220
1,280 1,052 -0,058 0,210 0,400 -0,415
1,280 1,052 -0,058 0,210 0,400 -0,415
1,304 1,103 0,075 0,275 0,471 -0,192
1,241 1,059 0,092 0,243 0,391 -0,109
1,176 1,021 0,145 0,238 0,384 0,021
1,172 1,025 0,161 0,221 0,353 0,080
1,147 1,005 0,133 0,167 0,301 0,089
1,142 1,002 0,203 0,281 0,426 0,100
Note: The aggregated variables EU15, EU25, etc.represent weighted means related to the populations of the Member States or candidate states on 1 January 200925
Annex 4. Correlations of the aggregated variables KKM related to the stages of the EU enlargement
EU15_KKM EU25_KKM EU27_KKM EU31_KKM EU31_15_KKM EU27_15_KKM EU25_15_KKM EU31_27_KKM
EU15_KKM Pearson Correlation 1 .996(**) .994(**) .919(**) -.681(*) .464 .745(*) -.838(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .030 .177 .014 .002
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
EU25_KKM Pearson Correlation .996(**) 1 1.000(**) .941(**) -.631 .537 .800(**) -.810(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .051 .109 .005 .005
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
EU27_KKM Pearson Correlation .994(**) 1.000(**) 1 .948(**) -.613 .556 .810(**) -.798(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .059 .095 .004 .006
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
EU31_KKM Pearson Correlation .919(**) .941(**) .948(**) 1 -.338 .707(*) .880(**) -.565
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .340 .022 .001 .089
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
EU31_15_KKM Pearson Correlation -.681(*) -.631 -.613 -.338 1 .208 -.143 .952(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .030 .051 .059 .340 .564 .694 .000
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
EU27_15_KKM Pearson Correlation .464 .537 .556 .707(*) .208 1 .924(**) -.102
Sig. (2-tailed) .177 .109 .095 .022 .564 .000 .780
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
EU25_15_KKM Pearson Correlation .745(*) .800(**) .810(**) .880(**) -.143 .924(**) 1 -.435
Sig. (2-tailed) .014 .005 .004 .001 .694 .000 .209
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
EU31_27_KKM Pearson Correlation -.838(**) -.810(**) -.798(**) -.565 .952(**) -.102 -.435 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .005 .006 .089 .000 .780 .209
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).26
Annex 5. Evolution of the index of economic freedom (IEF) for the EU Member States and acceding states
AT_IEF BE_IEF BG_IEF CY_IEF DK_IEF EE_IEF FI_IEF FR_IEF DE_IEF EL_IEF IE_IEF IT_IEF LV_IEF LT_IEF LU_IEF MT_IEF UK_IEF
7,360 7,680 5,030 6,220 7,630 7,350 7,500 7,040 7,500 6,640 8,130 7,090 6,690 6,260 7,810 6,450 8,250
7,190 7,360 5,560 6,310 7,430 7,570 7,370 6,720 7,290 6,570 7,930 6,950 6,810 6,370 7,780 6,420 8,110
7,080 7,150 5,870 6,720 7,390 7,620 7,360 6,810 7,290 6,240 7,820 6,940 7,020 6,720 7,760 6,720 8,010
7,630 7,320 6,140 6,850 7,610 7,710 7,610 7,040 7,610 6,980 7,740 6,710 6,870 6,690 7,740 6,480 8,130
7,670 7,260 6,150 6,450 7,630 7,700 7,580 7,180 7,580 6,930 7,860 6,840 6,990 6,950 7,760 7,170 8,080
7,560 7,260 6,500 7,390 7,730 7,920 7,750 7,100 7,650 6,990 8,090 7,030 7,350 7,430 7,640 7,380 8,100
7,590 7,140 6,670 7,320 7,720 7,850 7,630 7,130 7,570 7,030 7,950 7,080 7,440 7,370 7,620 7,390 8,020
7,670 7,180 6,740 7,360 7,740 7,810 7,620 7,430 7,500 7,110 7,980 6,950 7,220 7,380 7,650 7,540 7,890
7,000 7,150 6,290 7,130 7,920 7,780 7,480 6,540 7,120 6,010 8,240 6,250 6,830 7,080 7,520 6,600 7,950
7,160 7,010 6,230 7,090 7,790 7,470 7,380 6,420 7,110 6,270 8,130 6,270 6,620 7,030 7,540 6,720 7,650
NL_IEF PL_IEF PT_IEF CZ_IEF RO_IEF SK_IEF SI_IEF ES_IEF SE_IEF HU_IEF HR_IEF TR_IEF MK_IEF IS_IEF EU15_IEF EU25_IEF EU27_IEF
8,040 6,190 7,380 6,470 4,990 6,160 6,340 7,290 7,430 6,540 6,260 5,750 5,120 7,760 7,460 7,280 7,146
7,750 5,960 7,270 6,550 4,980 6,490 6,650 7,030 7,150 6,820 6,120 5,280 5,010 7,670 7,249 7,098 6,983
7,670 6,140 7,340 6,450 5,420 6,360 6,600 7,050 7,260 6,810 5,960 5,470 5,460 7,610 7,231 7,098 7,007
7,600 6,090 7,320 6,830 5,720 6,700 5,900 7,440 7,410 7,380 5,990 5,940 5,770 7,730 7,406 7,262 7,179
7,600 6,610 7,470 6,920 5,740 7,300 6,730 7,490 7,190 7,520 6,160 6,120 5,650 7,800 7,438 7,350 7,262
7,680 6,720 7,190 6,990 6,410 7,420 6,740 7,490 7,380 7,410 6,260 6,250 6,080 7,860 7,477 7,400 7,343
7,540 6,750 7,200 6,910 6,460 7,480 6,840 7,320 7,280 7,420 6,350 6,340 6,320 7,730 7,428 7,360 7,311
7,560 6,780 7,190 7,090 6,790 7,520 6,900 7,320 7,280 7,330 6,330 6,420 6,400 7,530 7,429 7,365 7,330
7,680 5,950 6,430 6,850 6,150 6,870 6,060 6,970 7,040 6,720 5,460 6,080 6,110 7,650 7,005 6,906 6,864
7,500 6,320 6,440 6,980 6,420 6,970 6,470 6,960 7,240 6,610 5,920 6,380 6,570 7,370 6,939 6,881 6,851
EU31_IEF EU31_15_IEF EU27_15_IEF EU31_27_IEF EU27_25_IEF EU25_15_IEF
6,961 5,872 5,947 5,771 5,000 6,319
6,761 5,695 5,968 5,330 5,131 6,296
6,805 5,875 6,151 5,506 5,538 6,392
7,013 6,153 6,309 5,945 5,830 6,498
7,108 6,386 6,587 6,117 5,847 6,878
7,197 6,583 6,831 6,252 6,434 6,987
7,181 6,640 6,861 6,345 6,515 6,997
7,208 6,725 6,955 6,419 6,777 7,025
6,754 6,207 6,324 6,052 6,187 6,378
6,786 6,451 6,518 6,363 6,370 6,576
Note: The aggregated variables EU15, EU25, etc.represent weighted means related to the populations of the Member States or candidate states on 1 January 200927
Annex 6.  Correlations of IEF for different stages of the EU enlargement
EU15_IEF EU25_IEF EU27_IEF EU31_IEF EU31_15_IEF EU27_15_IEF EU31_27_IEF EU27_25_IEF EU25_15_IEF
EU15_IEF Pearson Correlation 1 .976(**) .922(**) .813(**) .177 .259 .058 -.063 .484
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .004 .624 .470 .874 .862 .156
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
EU25_IEF Pearson Correlation .976(**) 1 .983(**) .915(**) .378 .460 .244 .141 .663(*)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .281 .181 .496 .698 .037
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
EU27_IEF Pearson Correlation .922(**) .983(**) 1 .970(**) .536 .612 .398 .320 .779(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .110 .060 .254 .368 .008
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
EU31_IEF Pearson Correlation .813(**) .915(**) .970(**) 1 .717(*) .762(*) .609 .512 .881(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .004 .000 .000 .020 .010 .062 .130 .001
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
EU31_15_IEF Pearson Correlation .177 .378 .536 .717(*) 1 .977(**) .960(**) .940(**) .910(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .624 .281 .110 .020 .000 .000 .000 .000
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
EU27_15_IEF Pearson Correlation .259 .460 .612 .762(*) .977(**) 1 .878(**) .929(**) .958(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .470 .181 .060 .010 .000 .001 .000 .000
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
EU31_27_IEF Pearson Correlation .058 .244 .398 .609 .960(**) .878(**) 1 .890(**) .783(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .874 .496 .254 .062 .000 .001 .001 .007
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
EU27_25_IEF Pearson Correlation -.063 .141 .320 .512 .940(**) .929(**) .890(**) 1 .782(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .862 .698 .368 .130 .000 .000 .001 .007
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
EU25_15_IEF Pearson Correlation .484 .663(*) .779(**) .881(**) .910(**) .958(**) .783(**) .782(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .156 .037 .008 .001 .000 .000 .007 .007
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).